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The failure of Israel to achieve its more sweeping objectives in its 
1982 invasion of Lebanon, largely, though not entirely, supported by the 
United States, together with the subsequent collapse of the American ef-
fort to create a stable, pro-Western regime in that country, makes it clear 
that the Reagan Administration's overall policies in the Middle East are 
in need of fundamental re-evaluation.1 Unless the United States initiates 
major changes in its policies and seeks to make use of the potential 
leverage its political, economic and military assistance to Israel gives it 
over that country's policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly 
regarding the Palestinian problem, basic American national interests are 
likely soon to be in serious jeopardy. 
The fundamental Mideast policy of the Reagan Administration — 
to an even greater degree than that of previous American administrations 
— has been that of nearly unqualified support of Israel. It is based on 
several factors. First, there is the assumption that Israel's interests, as 
defined by the Begin government and the present Labour-Likud coalition 
government, and America's interests are essentially identical. Second, it 
is presumed that the Arab-Israeli conflict is stable or at least that Israeli 
military might is unassailable, thus making political concessions to the 
Arabs unnecessary. Third, it is believed that the root cause of continued 
turmoil in the Middle East lies not in indigenous conflicts but rather in 
Soviet meddling. Finally, the American policy assumes that the 
"moderate" Arab states basically share the American view and can be 
convinced to ignore the Arab-Israeli conflict and join with the United 
States and Israel in a "strategic consensus," a de facto anti-Soviet, anti-
communist military alliance.2 
To implement these policies the Administration has shipped billions 
of dollars worth of the most advanced American weapons systems into 
the Middle East. Although some of the weapons have gone to Arab 
states, particularly Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Israel has received 
the lion's share. This massive new military support of Israel, which goes 
well beyond even the previously high levels, has been accompanied by 
matching policy statements. Whatever differences the United States 
might have, in theory, with some of Israel's policies, the Administration 
has no intention of using growing Israeli military and economic 
dependence on the United States as leverage to induce changes in those 
policies. 
American economic, political and, above all, military support have 
allowed the Israeli government to pursue its own highly nationalistic and 
military bent without fear of effective U.S. disapproval. Thus, within the 
past four years Israel has bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, bombed 
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civilian areas of Beirut in the summer of 1981, annexed the Golan 
Heights, invaded and occupied southern Lebanon, and has rapidly mov-
ed toward the de facto annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. 
Though the Reagan Administration has been unhappy about some of 
these actions, particularly the 1982 siege of Beirut, its disapproval has 
been limited to mild diplomatic statements and the temporary suspension 
of planned strategic military cooperation programs between the 
American and Israeli military establishments. Moreover, in the past year 
the Administration has discarded as "impractical" and "unrealistic" its 
earlier, desultory efforts to persuade Israel to reach a political settlement 
with the Palestinians and to withdraw from the West Bank, has resumed 
the "strategic military cooperation" programs, and has authorized 
record levels of economic and military assistance to Israel in the coming 
years.3 
AMERICAN POLICY AND ISRAELI REALITY 
The assumptions on which the Reagan Administration's policies are 
based are all inaccurate. There is widespread agreement that the major 
U.S. national interests in the Middle East are to ensure the survival of 
Israel, to maintain access to Arab oil at reasonable prices, to contain any 
actual or potential Soviet expansionism in the area and to attain these ob-
jectives without a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.4 All of 
these interests are currently endangered. Israel's policies, supported by 
the United States, are a threat to its own survival, are jeopardizing con-
tinued access to oil, are facilitating rather than containing the growing 
Soviet role in the area and are posing an on-going danger of a super-
power showdown. While it is true that a strongly anti-communist, pro-
American, politically stable and militarily powerful Israel could be a ma-
jor bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence, as well as against the 
indigenous Arab radicalism or fundamentalist nationalism, in an area 
critical to the economic prosperity of the West, the Lebanese war has 
made it clear that the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to overshadow 
other issues in the Middle East. Thus, a political settlement of the con-
flict is the necessary, even though not sufficient, precondition for the 
avoidance of war, the stabilizing of the Middle East, the securing of 
Western oil supplies, and the containment of expanding Soviet influence 
— if not for more ambitious goals, such as the creation of an alliance of 
status quo, anti-communist states. 
To a substantial degree because of recent American and Israeli 
policies, the overall situation in the Middle East has never been more 
perilous. To begin with, Israel is in the midst of the worst internal crisis 
of its history, one that threatens its democratic institutions and tradi-
tions, and perhaps even its viability. Inflation, fuelled by the world's 
largest military budget and the costs of occupying Lebanon, has risen at 
an alarming rate in the last few years, accelerating from 140 percent in 
1981 to an estimated 450 percent in 1984, with some economists predic-
ting a rate of over 1000 per cent in 1985 unless current trends are ar-
rested.3 Such inflation levels have been historically incompatible with the 
maintenance of democracy and political stability. The viability of 
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Israeli democracy is also threatened by a number of other alarming 
trends in Israeli society and political life. Since at least 1967 the role of 
the armed forces in the Israeli policy-making process has steadily increas-
ed, accompanied by several serious conflicts between the military 
establishment and the civilian political leadership. This trend reached its 
peak in the Lebanon war, in which Generals Sharon and Eitan planned 
and conducted the war to a considerable extent outside the realm of ef-
fective political control.' There are other serious strains on Israeli 
democracy as well, particularly the growth of religious fundamentalism 
and extremist nationalism and the burgeoning class, ethnic, and even 
racial conflict between the largely middle-class and well-educated 
Ashkenazi Jews of European descent and the poorer, less-educated 
Sephardic Jews more recently arrived from the Arab countries of the 
Middle East.7 
In addition to these intra-Jewish problems, Arabs already comprise 
over 40 percent of the population of Israel proper and the occupied ter-
ritories (500,000 Israeli Arabs and about 1.3 million Palestinian Arabs in 
the West Bank and Gaza). Because of the higher Arab population growth 
rate, the diminishing rate of Jewish immigration, and the rising rate of 
Jewish emigration, it is generally estimated that within a decade Israel is 
likely to be an Arab majority state. Thus an Israel determined to hold on 
to the occupied territories will either cease to be a Jewish state or (far 
more likely) it may have to restrict increasingly the political and civil 
rights of the Arab majority, resort to large-scale expulsion of the Arabs, 
and/or rely on repression to maintain the status quo. 
The overall effect of all of these strains on Israeli democracy is 
already severe, so much so that a number of prominent Israeli writers are 
warning of the growth of what they do not shrink from labelling 
"fascism" or "Judeo-Nazism," even "civil war" is not ruled out.' That 
it is not only intellectuals who are alarmed by all of these recent trends in 
Israel is indicated by the fact that for the first time since the establish-
ment of Israel in 1948, more Jews have emigrated from Israel in the last 
few years than have immigrated.' 
Second, the moderate, pro-Western Arab governments of the Mid-
dle East are being endangered by a combination of Islamic fundamen-
talism, Israeli intransigence, and the unwillingness or failure of the 
Reagan Administration to curb Israel or, at a minimum, to disassociate 
itself from recent Israeli expansionism. Supporters of Israeli policies like 
to argue that Israel is America's only reliable ally in the Middle East. At 
the moment this is oversimplified, but it could well become self-
fulfilling. Arab nationalism focusing on the plight of the Palestinians 
could threaten the internal political stability of all of America's allies in 
the area, especially Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Revolutionary 
upheaval could be sparked either by the radical left, supported by Syria, 
Libya, the PLO and the Soviet Union, or it could come from the fun-
damentalist right, modelled on and supported by Iran.10 In either case, 
the overthrow of existing Arab governments in the most vulnerable coun-
tries would be a disaster for both Israel and the United States. Even short 
of this, it is by no means certain that the Mubarak government in Egypt 
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will find it politically feasible, in light of both internal and external Arab 
pressures, to maintain a separate peace with an Israei bent on continuing 
its present course. ' ' If the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and other pro-
vocative Israeli policies resulted, for example, in an Egyptian repudiation 
of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel or, even worse, a replacement of the 
Mubarak government with a fundamentalist Moslem regime, those con-
sequences alone would far outweigh any of Israel's military victories. 
Third, Western access to Middle Eastern oil at reasonable prices 
could again be jeopardized by Israeli policies (though, of course, other 
unrelated area conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran war, could also have this 
effect). The identification of the United States with Israel led to the Arab 
oil embargo in 1973 and facilitated the political cooperation among the 
Arab oil-producing states that provided the necessary underpinning for 
the dramatic OPEC oil price increases later in the 1970s. At present, U.S. 
relations with Saudi Arabia, the key oil-producing state of the Middle 
East, have been seriously strained by the U.S. failure to use its influence 
with Israel regarding Lebanon or the West Bank. Though the Saudis 
have refrained from threats to invoke the oil weapon again, perhaps in 
part because the current oil glut would make an embargo or major price 
rise ineffective, the revival of a tight oil market, expected by many oil ex-
perts within the next few years, could dramatically change the 
situation.12 In the worse case, the replacement of the Saudi regime by a 
radical or fundamentalist regime could result in the cut off of Western oil 
from that country, as happened in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah. 
Finally, Israeli policies have created opportunities for the expansion 
of Soviet economic, political and military influence throughout the area 
and have increased the risk of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. This is 
particularly the case in Syria. Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 
Soviets have sent their most modern tanks, aircraft and SAM missile 
systems to that country, along with some 7000 troops or advisors to man 
directly Soviet weapons systems and to support front-line Syrian units. 
To be sure, the Syrians have often demonstrated their independence of 
the Soviet Union. Still, given the escalated Soviet commitment to Syria, a 
new Syrian-Israeli war would seriously increase the prospects of a super-
power confrontation. 
What should be done? Israel must be induced to make fundamental 
changes in its current policies, particularly in the occupied territories, by 
some combination of U.S. carrot and stick policies. An imposed peace set-
tlement would be in Israeli's true interests as well as those of the United 
States. The fundamental interests of Israel lie in military security, 
economic prosperity, political independence, and the preservation of its 
democratic system — not in expansion, which threatens all of those values. 
Israel, as George Ball has argued, must be saved "in spite of herself."13 
This may seem presumptuous, but history affords numerous examples of 
nations that have come to grief because of disastrous miscalculation about 
their best interests. Both Ball and others feel the Israeli government is 
making grave errors in its assessment of the Palestinian problem, and that 
its policies are harming both Israel's and Amelia's long-term interests. 
Therefore the United States, which has consistently provided 
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crucial support for Israel and whose record leaves no doubt of its com-
mitment to that country, has not only the right but the obligation to act 
on the basis of its own assessments. 
Currently, there is something approaching an international consen-
sus on what would constitute a fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. This consensus is shared by most independent analysts of the con-
flict, by most European governments, and increasingly by moderate 
Arab states as well as a substantial number, though still very much a 
minority, of Israelis. The most important elements of this perceived set-
tlement are an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders, with possible 
minor modifications, the creation of a limited and controlled Palestinian 
state in the West Bank and Gaza, and a full and guaranteed peace bet-
ween Israel, the Palestinians, and all the leading Arab states.14 
Moreover, there is a general agreement that an active American role in 
seeking such a settlement is essential, for "the factors hampering com-
munication and eventual negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis 
are much too powerful to be overcome without outside help . . . [which] 
can only come from the United States."15 Finally, few believe that the 
status quo can be perpetuated much longer, given the explosive nature of 
the current situation.16 
However, there is no agreement on what the American role should 
be. Most interested individuals call simply for active mediation." 
However, in the author's judgement this is inadequate, given the depth 
of Israeli intransigence on the question of a Palestinian state and the on-
going process of de facto annexation of the West Bank through Jewish 
settlement." It is for these reasons that an imposed settlement may be 
unavoidable, despite the formidable arguments that can be made against 
it and despite the general importance of maintaining the non-
intervention norm in international politics. 
What can be done? In the short-run, continued major U.S. 
economic and military assistance to Israel should be made contingent 
upon several Israeli policy changes. First, Israel must suspend any fur-
ther settlement of the West Bank. Second, Israel must be induced to 
withdraw from its current position on the future of the West Bank, 
namely, that it will never withdraw under any conditions, not merely or 
even primarily because of security concerns but because "Judea and 
Samaria" are Jewish lands. As long as Israel holds to this position, there 
is no basis for negotiations either with the PLO, whatever its future role 
might be, or even with far more moderate Palestinians." Still, given the 
PLO's historical record, at this point Israel should be asked only to agree 
to the principle of eventual withdrawal from the occupied territories, the 
actual implementation occurring only gradually and in the context of a 
variety of strong guarantees for Israel's security. Third, the Israeli 
government must be induced to drop its current policy that it will not 
negotiate with the PLO under any conditions, even if, for example, the 
PLO should agree to recognize Israel and explicitly and unambiguously 
seek the path of political change. Such a policy offers no incentive for 
moderation on the part of the PLO, and indeed is probably so 
designed.20 Finally, Israel must agree to withdraw its opposition to 
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beginning negotiations on the basis of the "Reagan Plan," under which 
the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza wouid be offered 
"autonomy" and self-rule in a vaguely defined "association" with Jor-
dan. Although this proposal ignores the PLO and definitely rules out an 
independent state for the Palestinians, the moderate Arab states, and 
evidently even some sectors of the PLO (perhaps including Arafat 
himself), view it as a starting point.21 
SETTLEMENT AND THE PALESTINIANS 
Until now, those groups in the PLO willing to begin negotiations on 
the basis of the Reagan Plan have not been sufficiently strong to carry a 
majority. However, even if for tactical reasons the PLO should eventual-
ly agree to begin talking on such a basis, in the long run it is highly 
unlikely that half measures will suffice. Palestinian nationalism, like 
Zionism, or Jewish nationalism before it, will be satisfied only with the 
creation of an independent state. Thus the overall goal of American 
policy should be the creation of a full-fledged Palestinian state, and 
American assistance to Israel should be increasingly tied to Israel's will-
ingness to allow the creation of such a state under the appropriate condi-
tions. 
The best way to create a Palestinian state would be to partition the 
ancient land of Palestine between Israel, within its pre-1967 boundaries, 
and the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank of the Jordan River and the 
Gaza strip." There are a number of reasons by the West Bank and the 
Gaza form appropriate locations for a Palestinian state. In the first 
place, no existing state has a clear, unambiguous claim to either area. 
The Gaza strip, through administered by Egypt for some years, is not 
Egyptian territory and is not claimed by the present Egyptian govern-
ment. Similarly, the status of the West Bank is uncertain. After the 
British defeated the Ottoman Empire in 1917 the West Bank became part 
of the League of Nations mandate to Britain. During the course of the 
1948 Arab attack on Israel, the West Bank was occupied by Jordan. 
However, it was lost to Israel in the 1967 war, and King Hussein has since 
renounced any claim to the land in favour of a claim by the Palestinians. 
Israel's major claim to legitimate ownership of the area is based on the 
religious ties of Judaism to the area and previous occupation some two 
thousand years ago. This claim, to put it mildly, is not impressive, having 
no standing in either international law or common sense. The religious 
ties of Islam to the area are no less strong than those of Judaism and, of 
greater importance, Arabs have lived on the land for thirteen hundred 
consecutive years and still form the overwhelming majority of the cur-
rent inhabitants, even after the fifteen years of Jewish settlement since 
the 1967 war. 
Thus, the present status of both Gaza and the West Bank is 
anomolous, which has the major advantage of making it easier to create 
a new state there. Secondly, the area is appropriate for a new Palestinian 
state for symbolic reasons. It is undeniably part of ancient, historical 
"Palestine." The creation of an Arab Palestinian state located primarily 
on the West Bank would amount to a partition of historical Palestine, 
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the normal compromise solution whenever two diametrically opposed 
and irreconcilable nationalist movements lay claim to the same area. To 
be sure, prior to the creation of Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab 
states repeatedly rejected partition plans that the Zionists were prepared 
to accept. Nonetheless, given the current Middle East realities, there are 
good reasons to believe that the Arabs would be more amenable to a par-
tition settlement today." Thirdly, the West Bank and Gaza are the ap-
propriate places for a new Palestinian state because the current popula-
tion of those areas is still overwhelmingly Palestinian. 
Of course, no Palestinian state could or should be created if this 
were irreconcilable with the basic security of Israel. However, it can also 
be contended that the establishment of such a state would be far more 
likely to be conducive to real peace, and therefore real Israeli security, 
than a continuation of the attempt to prevent it. To begin with, a Palesti-
nian state could not be created on an unconditional basis. Israel would 
have to have both the right and the capability of ensuring that such a 
state would accept a variety of constraints on its policies and actions 
designed to ensure that it would not become a base for continued Palesti-
nian war on Israel. A new Palestinian state would have to commit itself 
officially and unambiguously to a peace settlement with Israel based on 
the permanent partition of "Palestine." It would have to accept severe 
limitations on its armaments, with its military establishment tailored to 
that necessary to maintain internal order. It would have to refrain from 
entering into military alliances with other states, particularly the Soviet 
Union and extremist Arab states; and, it would have to prevent terrorist 
groups from using Palestine as a base for continued attacks on Israel.24 
The Palestinians are entitled to a homeland and a state of their own, not 
a base for the destruction of Israel. In any case, the former is the most 
they can possibly get, and there are a variety of indications that most 
Palestinians, including Arafat and a growing number of his followers 
within the PLO leadership, know and accept that reality." 
Supposing, then, that the PLO agreed to accept a state on the West 
Bank and the Gaza as the definitive realization of its nationalist aspira-
tions, and was further to agree to a number of measures designed to 
reassure Israel of its security, how could such an agreement be enforced 
once a new state was formed? What would happen if a subsequent 
Palestinian government reneged on the agreement? Is Israel being asked 
to "trust" the Palestinians with its future in exchange for paper pro-
mises? This is not the case. To begin with, a Palestinian state on the West 
Bank and the Gaza would be tiny, economically highly dependent on 
outside support, divided in two by Israel itself, and militarily inconse-
quential. It would be vulnerable not only to economic pressure but to be-
ing overrun by Israel in a matter of hours. The Israelis cite geography as 
the basis of the security concerns, with the West Bank located only fif-
teen miles from Tel Aviv. But this could be seen as advantageous to 
Israel, especially given the disparity of military power between Israel and 
a prospective Palestinian state. In effect, a Palestinian state would be on 
permanent notice that any serious violation of the restrictions which it 
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accepted, as a condition of existence, would be grounds for reoccupation 
by Israel, which could accomplish this with relative ease." 
Secondly, the leading moderate Arab states, on whom the PLO is 
more dependent than ever, have indicated, at least privately, their will-
ingness to accept a partition of Palestine as the definitive settlement of 
the overall Arab-Israeli conflict." Once a Palestinian state was establish-
ed, Israel would hardly be the only state in the area that would insist that 
it refrain from radicalism, terrorism and interventionism. A Palestinian 
state on the West Bank and Gaza would have Jordan on its east, and that 
country's ruler, King Hussein, has already quite convincingly 
demonstrated his willingness and capability to suppress Palestinian 
radicalism. To the west would be Egypt, which has already reached a 
peace settlement with Israel and has repeatedly demonstrated its reluc-
tance to go to war regarding the Palestinians. Not far to the south would 
be Saudi Arabia, clearly the primary potential source of financial 
assistance to a new Palestinian state, and not likely to be interested in 
subsidizing a new focal point of radicalism in the Middle East, especially 
in the context of a general peace settlement with Israel that included 
some form of Moslem rule or administration of East Jerusalem. Of the 
"confrontation states," only Syria seems adamant. However, even Syria 
might want to disengage from such an isolated struggle, especially if 
Israel returned the Golan Heights.2' Despite his extremist rhetoric, Assad 
of Syria has demonstrated his pragmatic view of Israel on a number of 
occasions: negotiating a military disengagement with Israel in 1974 and 
1977, preventing the PLO from attacking Israel from Syrian territory 
since 1975, violently repressing the PLO in northern Lebanon in the late 
1970s, and avoiding any significant military conflict with Israel since 
1973, other than the fighting initiated by Israel in Lebanon in 1982. 
In short, surrounded by far more powerful neighbours determined 
to ensure that it remained on its best behaviour, as well as financially 
weak and dependent on foreign assistance, a new Palestinian state would 
have little choice but to concentrate strictly on ensuring domestic stabili-
ty and development. The logic of that position at present is not lost on 
many Palestinians and, once they were given a real stake in preserving 
the status quo, the logic should surely be more compelling in the future. 
Perhaps the most decisive argument for the creation of a Palestinian 
state is that there is no other practical or morally acceptable alternative. 
Until now, Israel has chosen the path of military suppression of Palesti-
nian nationalism, but in the long run this policy is most likely to fail. 
Alternatively, even if suppression should succeed indefinitely, the price 
would be too high. The historical experience of colonial rule since World 
War II is instructive in this respect. Though Israel came into possession 
of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 as a result 
of a purely defensive war provoked by persistent Arab aggression against 
Israel, nonetheless, in the seventeen years since then, Israeli policies, at-
titudes and behaviour in the occupied areas have increasingly come to 
resemble classic colonialism. Of particular concern is the formal Israeli 
annexation of the Golan Heights, military rule over the Gaza strip, and 
the occupation and settlement of the West Bank, which is inexorably 
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leading toward annexation, de facto if not formal. The territorial expan-
sion of Israel has been accompanied, as was that of the Western colonial 
powers, by a variety of ideological, religious and nationalistic ra-
tionalizations seeking to legitimize force and justify outside rule." 
The colonial experience has demonstrated that once nationalist 
resistance is aroused it rarely can be effectively suppressed and it is only a 
matter of time before outsiders are driven out. Until that occurs, 
however, the effort to maintain control invariably brings out the worst in 
both ruler and ruled. What only a few years ago was simply a prediction 
for Israel is now rapidly becoming a reality. Among the Arabs in the oc-
cupied territories — and increasingly among Israeli Arabs as well30 — 
there is an inflamed nationalism, the development of violent resistance to 
Israeli rule, and the silencing through social pressures or outright terror 
of the more moderate voices. Further, among the Israeli occupiers there 
is an increasingly nationalist and violent response, including private, 
vigilante actions, government curtailment of basic political rights and 
military repression.31 
As instructive as the general history of the failure of colonialism 
may be, of much greater importance has been the specific history of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even before the invasion of Lebanon, 
Israel's policy, in fact, if not officially, was that of massive retaliation 
-not merely an eye for an eye, but many eyes for one eye. This was 
justified on the familiar assumption that "the only thing the Arabs 
understand is force."32 Presumably what the Palestinians are supposed 
to "understand" is that they have more to lose than to gain through ter-
rorism. Thus, the test of Israeli policy, leaving aside moral considera-
tions for the moment, must obviously be whether it has successfully 
deterred terrorism. Yet, the historical evidence strongly suggests that ter-
rorism has not been deterred and, rather, that the Israeli policy of 
massive retaliation leads to war.33 In the early 1950s Israel began respon-
ding to Palestinian terrorist raids from bases in Egypt by ever-increasing 
retaliation in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza strip. In 1933, following a 
particularly devastating and humiliating Israeli raid into Gaza, Nasser 
turned to the Soviet Union for arms, and it was the large-scale Egyptian 
acquisition of Soviet arms that precipitated the Israeli attack on Egyptian 
forces and Palestinian base camps in the Sinai in 1936. Similarly, the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war was set in motion by a cycle of Palestinian ter-
rorism and Israeli retaliation. By early 1967 growing raids on Israel, this 
time from guerrilla bases in Jordan and Syria, led to an Israeli decision to 
mount a major military operation against Syria, the most important 
source of arms and political support for the Palestinians. To counter the 
imminent Israeli attack, the Syrians signed a defense pact with Egypt, 
and it was Nasser's subsequent decisions to move major military forces 
into the Sinai, to expel the UN peacekeeping force, to close the Gulf of 
Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and to escalate the rhetoric of hatred and pro-
posed annihilation of Israel that precipitated the Israeli preventive attack 
on Syrian and Egyptian forces in June 1967.34 Recently, years of Palesti-
nian raids on Israel from Lebanon, followed by much more devastating 
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Israeli retaliatory raids against PLO bases, ended in the 1982 Israeli inva-
sion and occupation of Lebanon. 
It seems, then, that Israeli retaliation resulted only in new recruits 
for the PLO, renewed support of Palestinian nationalism by leading 
Arab states, a cycle of action and reaction, attack and counterattack, 
that has always culminated in war. Somehow the Israelis have failed to 
observe that thirty years of massive retaliation have inflamed Palestinian 
nationalism rather than diminished it and, in turn, have precipitated 
Palestinian terrorism rather than deterred it. 
Moreover, the moral issue cannot be ignored. In the last few years 
the actions of the Begin/Shamir governments have gone a long way 
toward hopelessly clouding the "terrorism" issue.35 In strictly numerical 
terms, Israeli retaliation has been far more destructive of innocent lives 
than PLO terrorism.36 Even before the invasion of Lebanon, Israel had 
been responding to PLO attacks (including those against soldiers as well 
as civilians) with massive attacks in Lebanon and elsewhere, using in-
discriminate weapons such as artillery, air bombardment, napalm and 
anti-personnel weapons that have had the predictable consequence of a 
heavy loss of life among innocent civilians, many or most of them not 
even Palestinians. For example, in 1978 Israel invaded southern Lebanon 
in retaliation for PLO terrorism that, in the course of the previous year, 
had killed 140 Israelis. The Israeli raid, making use of massive firepower, 
was reported to have killed at least a thousand people, nearly all of them 
Lebanese civilians rather than PLO fighters.37 In April 1979, Israel 
retaliated against a Palestinian raid with four days of heavy artillery fire 
and air attacks, killing about fifty, wounding hundreds, and inflicting 
heavy property damage.3' In July 1981, Israeli planes bombed an apart-
ment house in Beirut that allegedly contained "PLO offices," killing at 
least three hundred people, few of them either PLO leaders or even 
Palestinians.3' 
All of this, of course, pales before the destructiveness of the 1982 in-
vasion of Lebanon. There is a bitter dispute over the number of civilian 
casualties stemming from the invasion, with estimates ranging from 
about five hundred (the Israeli claim) to nineteen thousand (according to 
the Lebanese government).40 Whatever the exact figure, there is no doubt 
that Israel bombed and shelled highly populated areas and killed large 
numbers of civilians, that it levelled large numbers of Palestinian homes 
and businesses throughout all occupied Lebanon as part of its clear 
policy of making it difficult not merely for the PLO but for all Palesti-
nians to remain in Lebanon, and that it stood idly by while its closest 
Lebanese allies, the Phalangists, massacred hundreds of Palestinian 
men, women and children.41 
Aside from the moral issue, the invasion of Lebanon has been a 
disaster in terms of its economic, political and military consequences. If 
the purpose of the Israeli attack had been limited to restoring security to 
its northern border areas, the foray might have turned out differently. 
However, it is clear that Begin and Sharon had far more ambitious or 
even grandiose objectives: to drive the PLO and perhaps the Palestinians 
in general out of Lebanon, to break the political power of the PLO in the 
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occupied territories by defeating and humilating it in Lebanon, to 
discourage Palestinian resistance to Israeli control over and eventual an-
nexation of the West Bank, to drive the Syrian Army from Lebanon and 
thus curtail Syrian influence in that country, to install pro-Israeli 
Lebanese Christians in power throughout Lebanon, and to secure a per-
manent peace with Lebanon.42 None of the objectives has been attained. 
Even Israel's minimal objective of security in the north is likely to last 
only as long as Israeli forces continue to occupy southern Lebanon, an 
occupation that is increasingly unpopular in Israel because of the grow-
ing Lebanese resistance to it, the continuing Israeli casualties, and the 
high economic costs. Even though the PLO was initially driven from 
Lebanon, its guerrilla forces have since returned to the northern part of 
that country and reportedly are filtering back into southern Lebanon. 
Moreover, the PLO forces now returning to Lebanon represent the most 
radical, aggressive, and best-armed elements of the movement. Further, 
there is no evidence that the political power of the PLO and/or its leader-
ship position over the Palestinians in the occupied territories have been 
permanently destroyed, despite defeat in Lebanon and despite, indeed, 
its own internal divisions and the explusion of Yasir Arafat from 
Lebanon by dissident PLO groups supported by Syria. On the contrary, 
the PLO's military defeat in Lebanon has paradoxically led to impor-
tant, unexpected political gains, for the Israeli invasion has generated in-
creased worldwide sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause and, 
more than ever, the PLO in general and Arafat in particular are recogniz-
ed as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. Currently, 
Arafat is negotiating on behalf of the Palestinians with President 
Mubarak and King Hussein.43 Meanwhile, Syria has rebuilt its army with 
high-technology weaponry, supplied by the Soviet Union, and Syria also 
received direct support with over ten thousand Soviet advisors stationed 
in the country. As a result, it has established control over northern 
Lebanon, and has gained substantial control over the anti-Arafat wing of 
the PLO. The short-lived Lebanese peace treaty with Israel has already 
been abrogated, and Lebanon has once again been plunged back into 
political instability and internecine violence. 
Having argued that Israel must agree to the establishment of an in-
dependent Palestinian state in the occupied territories because its current 
policies of repression of Palestinian nationalism are morally unaccep-
table, are serious straining Israeli democracy, and in any case are failing 
to achieve their objectives, consideration should be taken of at least three 
additional reasons for Israel to change course. First, there are indications 
that Pan-Arabist sentiments are again on the rise throughout the Arab 
world. The focal point of Pan-Arabism today is the Palestinian cause. 
No Arab state outside of Egypt either wants or feels free to make peace 
with Israel in the face of Palestinian opposition. It is hardly certain that 
even Egypt will be able to maintain the peace treaty with Israel in the pre-
sent circumstances. Second, Israel has never been more politically 
isolated for many of its previously strong supporters in Western Europe 
and the United States are profoundly disturbed by Israel's recent policies 
and increasingly inclined to view the continuation of the Arab-Israeli 
51 
Spring 1985 
conflict as at least as much a function of Israeli militarism and intran-
sigence as of Arab fanaticism.44 Because of this disenchantment, in the 
future Israel may not be able to depend on the nearly automatic support 
of the United States, its last reliable ally. 
Most fearful of all is the prospect that, sooner or later, certain Arab 
states and perhaps even the PLO will acquire nuclear weapons, raising 
the spectre that future Arab-Israeli wars could end with the destruction 
of Israel. Thus, even so far as "security" considerations genuinely 
played an important role in the invasion of Lebanon and in the continued 
occupation of the West Bank, those considerations must fade into in-
significance when one considers the long-term security consequences for 
an isolated Israel in an Arab world dominated by fanatics and fun-
damentalists and armed with the most modern weapons of mass destruc-
tion. 
This last point can hardly be overemphasized. The major implica-
tion of the nuclear prospect is that real security for Israel can be found 
only through coexistence, or at least mutual deterrence, between Israel 
and an independent Palestinian state. If for no other reason, the prospect 
of a desperate, fanatical, Palestinian terrorist group in possession of a 
single nuclear weapon should persuade Israel that military suppression of 
Palestinian nationalism is utterly hopeless. A stateless nuclear terrorist 
group may be, quite simply, undeterrable, for the Israelis might not 
know where, or even against whom, to retaliate if they were subjected to 
nuclear blackmail or an outright attack. A Palestinian state, on the other 
hand, would be subject to the same calculations of deterrence as any 
other state and because of this would pose far less of a nuclear danger to 
Israel. 
WOULD AMERICAN PRESSURE WORK? 
The central argument of this article has been that the United States, 
both in its own interests and those of Israel, should use its enormous 
potential leverage to bring about changes in Israel's current policies 
toward the Palestinians. However, there is a widespread view, assiduous-
ly fostered by the Israeli government, that Israel simply will not be mov-
ed by external pressures or, alternatively, that such pressures would be 
dangerous and counterproductive. It is contended, in support, that the 
Arabs might be misled about the basic U.S. commitment to Israel and be 
encouraged to become more intransigent or that a desperate Israel might 
react to diminished American economic and military assistance by a 
"preemptive" attack on its Arab enemies designed to score a decisive 
military victory before Israel became too weak.45 
Certainly, it is the case that any U.S. pressures would have to be 
serious and sustained to be effective. Israel would have to be convinced 
that it could not ride out short-term shifts in U.S. policy and rely on am-
bivalence and internal divisions within the Administration, Congres-
sional resistance to policy changes, and the domestic Israeli lobby to 
force a quick return to traditional policies of unconditional U.S. sup-
port. Recent history is quite instructive in this regard. Each American 
president since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and before Reagan became 
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convinced in turn that both Israeli and American national interests re-
quired a negotiated and guaranteed peace resulting in Israeli withdrawal 
from virtually all the territories captures in the 1967 war." However, in 
seeking to induce Israeli flexibility, American administrations have 
wavered inconsistently between two beliefs. First, it was argued that the 
best way to bring about Israeli concessions was to make Israel feel more 
secure by providing it with increased economic and military assistance 
and closer security ties to the United States. Second, and conversely, it 
has been contended that unconditional U.S. support merely induced 
Israeli overconfidence and intransigence. 
Most frequently, U.S. government policies have been based on the 
first premise. However, from time to time American presidents have 
become disillusioned with the results of that course and have shifted to 
the second premise. In the typical pattern, Israel has then been publicly 
and privately threatened with a fundamental "reassessment" of U.S. 
policy, and these threats have been accompanied by some mild, largely 
symbolic pressures, such as the "suspension" of the next-scheduled 
delivery of U.S. war planes. Usually within a very short time, the 
"reassessments" are called off and full-scale assistance is resumed. 
There have been several reasons for this pattern. Often the administra-
tion itself has been internally divided, with a number of powerful groups, 
particularly in the defense establishment, arguing that America's own 
Middle Eastern interests require unreserved support of the powerful 
Israeli military machine. The Israeli government, too, has reacted to mild 
pressures with a show of indignation and an insistence that it will ignore 
U.S. views and hold fast to its policies. Finally, there has been effective 
protest from the American pro-Israeli lobby and its numerous and 
powerful supporters in Congress. The classic example of this pattern oc-
curred in 1975, when Henry Kissinger publicly blamed Israeli stubborn-
ness for the existing statement in Israeli-Eygptian negotiations over the 
Sinai, and the Ford Administration then threatened a "reassessment" of 
U.S. policy. For a brief period, the U.S. government delayed delivery of 
weapons and other assistance to Israel. At this, the Israeli lobby mounted 
a major campaign against the Administration, and seventy-six Senators 
signed a letter to President Ford strongly opposing any continued 
pressures on Israel. With the Administration divided on the wisdom and 
the efficacy of pressuring Israel and the Israeli government seemingly un-
moved, the Senatorial letter and other cries of outrage in the United 
States put an end to the Administration's "reassessment," and normal 
aid deliveries were resumed.47 Accordingly, over the years Israel has 
learned that it can disregard the passing or, in some cases, the deeper 
disillusion of American presidents. Other American disenchantment, 
governmental or private, with Israeli policies, can be treated in much the 
same manner. All Israel has to do is wait for — or, more accurately, help 
to induce — the inevitable counterpressures. In most cases within a brief 
period American assistance is resumed at even higher levels, freeing 
Israel from any further need to take U.S. policies and preferences into 
account. 
Israeli policy, then, does not respond to positive inducements alone, 
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nor to diplomatic appeals, public criticism, or symbolic, short-term, 
evidently half-hearted sanctions. However, there is abundant evidence 
that the Israelis do respond to serious American pressures. In 1956 Israel 
withdrew from the Sinai when the Eisenhower Administration threaten-
ed to cut off all U.S. aid.4' In 1967 U.S. pressures forced Israel to accept 
a ceasefire and refrain from further advances into Syria.49 In the 1973 
war Israel agreed to a ceasefire and halted its advance into Egypt only 
after Henry Kissinger threatened to end the American military airlift to 
Israel and to fly in food, water and medicine to surrounded Egyptian 
forces.50 In 1975 Israel agreed to a partial withdrawal from the Sinai 
after the Nixon Administration combined promises of new American aid 
with the threat of a major shift in U.S. policy if Israel failed to 
withdraw." In 1979, similar carrot-and-stick policies by the Carter Ad-
ministration induced a reluctant Begin to agree to the complete 
withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai in exchange for a peace treaty with 
Egypt.52 In July 1981 suspensions of some U.S. military aid deliveries, 
this time augmented by pressures from American Jewish leaders and 
close supporters of Israel in Congress, convinced Begin he had to end the 
bombing of civilians in Beirut and accept a ceasefire in Lebanon or face a 
major shift in American attitudes toward Israel.53 Finally, the Israelis 
discarded their planned ground assault against the PLO in Beirut in 1982 
after strong Congressional representations that threatened the end of the 
policy of unconditional U.S. aid to Israel.54 
The potential for American leverage over Israeli policies has never 
been greater than it is at present. The United States is now providing $2.6 
billion annually in military and economic assistance to Israel, and for the 
next fiscal year the Israeli government has requested a total of $4.85 
billion.55 In addition, the American government in effect subsidizes 
private foreign aid to Israel, for it allows Americans to make tax-exempt 
contributions to a number of U.S. Jewish organizations. A good part of 
the estimated two to three billion dollars raised every year by these 
organizations is known to be channelled to the Jewish Agency in Israel, 
an unofficial subsidiary of the Israeli government.56 
Israel's economy is critically dependent on this flow of money from 
the United States. Additionally, Israel is at least equally dependent on 
American assistance in order to maintain its military edge over its Arab 
neighbours. Over 40 percent of Israel's gross national product is spent on 
defense, an enormous burden it could not afford but for American help, 
and the United States directly pays for 37 percent of Israel's total defense 
budget in the form of loans on extremely concessionary terms or of 
outright grants.57 Moreover, the United States is the only source of the 
high technology, weapons systems that are so critical to Israel's power. 
Besides this economic and military assistance, the United States 
guarantees Israel's oil supply and is Israel's only reliable and significant 
source of diplomatic friendship and support on the world scene. Without 
this support, Israel would be almost completely isolated. Not surprising-
ly, Israel also relies on the United States to deter possible Soviet interven-
tion in any future Arab-Israeli wars, a deterrence which came into play 
during the 1967 and 1973 conflicts. 
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For all of these powerful reasons, Israel has every incentive to take 
seriously any U.S. pressures to change its present policies. There are as 
well additional positive inducements that the United States could offer to 
produce Israeli flexibility and concessions. The most important would be 
a firm, formal U.S. defence treaty with Israel that would commit the 
United States to guarantee Israel's territorial security within (and only 
within) its pre-1967 borders. The United States has been moving closer 
and closer to such a commitment since the mid-1950s, when it became 
Israel's major supplier of economic and military assistance. As a result 
of this aid and of U.S. actions to deter possible Soviet intervention in the 
1967 and 1973 wars, it is now taken for granted by all concerned that the 
United States will not allow the destruction of Israel. In the last few 
years, the United States has gone well beyond previous assurances in its 
efforts to convince Israel to agree to the disengagement agreement with 
Egypt and Syria and the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. As a result, the 
United States is now committed to: supplying the most modern ar-
maments to Israel; providing its own troops to watch over the interna-
tional buffer zone in the Sinai; taking diplomatic, economic and military 
measures as appropriate if the security of Israel is endangered by Egyp-
tian violations of the peace treaty; and supporting Israel if its survival or 
security is threatened by a "world power." Finally, in the last few years 
the American defence establishment has been developing increasingly 
close military and intelligence links of various kinds with the Israeli arm-
ed forces and intelligence services." 
In effect, then, the United States already has a de facto military 
alliance with Israel, and it remains only to formalize and institutionalize 
it in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Such a treaty 
would be given added credibility and deterrent value by the stationing of 
U.S. troops (at least in symbolic numbers) in Israel, a step that Israel, 
which, in the past, has been disdainful of international guarantees, has 
indicated it would now welcome. 
To be sure, a formal Israeli-American alliance would entail some 
risks. However, the truly vital U.S. national and moral interest in a just 
and lasting Arab-Israeli peace settlement justifies taking those risks. 
Moreover, there have been a number of indications that in the context of 
a comprehensive peace most Arab states would not oppose a U.S. 
alliance with Israel and an American military presence in the area. Such a 
presence would provide the Arab states with a powerful argument 
against the actions of their own militants and rejectionists in continuing a 
dangerous and futile struggle with Israel. Indeed, many Arab states 
would welcome a U.S. military deterrent against potential Soviet expan-
sionism and perhaps even against internal uprisings aimed at this own 
governments. 
What would be the Jewish reaction — in the United States, in the 
world Jewish community, and in Israel itself — to a shift in American 
policies toward Israel? It is clear that new American policies, genuinely 
designed to bring about a fair political settlement of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, would command substantial Jewish support, even with bitter 
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opposition from the Israeli government. The last few years have seen promi-
nent Jewish political leaders and intellectuals publicly criticizing Israel for 
the first time since 1948, particularly over the invasion of Lebanon, the siege 
of Beirut, complicity in Phalangist massacres, and the continuing settlement 
of the West Bank." 
Within Israel itself, there is widespread and growing opposition to the 
policies of the Israeli government. The Peace Now movement, though a 
minority, is an important force in Israel, and even before the invasion of 
Lebanon it was criticizing the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
on moral grounds, for its distortion of internal resources, for the interna-
tional isolation it caused Israel, and because it endangered the peace process. 
Since the invasion, a growing number of Israel's former political and 
military leaders and "the mainstream of Israeli scholars, intellectuals and 
writers" have begun to speak out bluntly about the diminishing prospects 
and for the continuation of Israeli democracy should the government con-
tinue on its present path.60 
Disenchantment with the government is not limited to elite sectors of 
Israeli opinion. Though the Labour Party's position on the future of the 
West Bank is vague and ambivalent, the announced position of the party is 
"territorial compromise" and the return of substantial sectors of the area to 
Jordan. This is a long way short of support for an independent Palestinian 
state, but it is an equally long way from the hard-line of the Likud govern-
ment and represents a major step in the right direction. Similarly, general 
Israeli public opinion is far more flexible than that of the government. Re-
cent polls show that 53 percent of Israelis are willing to return all or part of 
the occupied territories in exchange for peace, and 54 percent favour a freeze 
on new settlements.61 
Most remarkable of all is a recent development that would have been 
simply unthinkable only a few years ago. At first only privately, but now 
sometimes publicly, prominent Israeli leaders are urging both American 
Jews and the U.S. government to end their unconditional political, 
economic and military support of Israel. Political writers such as Jacobo 
Timerman, Amos Hon, Gideon Samet and Amos Kenan, former generals 
such as Mattiyahu Peled, and a number of prominent leaders of the Labour 
Party are all calling for sharp cuts in private and public American aid and 
warning that the present position of American Jewish organizations and the 
Reagan Administration will lead to "future calamity both for Israel and for 
American interests in the region."62 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, vital American interests and the future of Israel itself are 
gravely endangered by Israel's current policies and by lavish American sup-
port of those policies. A combination of U.S. pressures and positive in-
ducements to Israel to reach a comprehensive settlement, which inevitably 
must include nearly total Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 boundaries and 
the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, would 
best serve both U.S. and Israeli interests, would have an excellent chance of 
success, and would command widespread support in the United States, in 
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